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Abstract
This qualitative study examines membership processes in groups operating in
an uncertain environment that prevents them from fully predefining new mem-
bers’ roles. I describe how nine elite high-end, cutting-edge culinary groups in
the U.S. and Europe, ranging from innovative restaurants to culinary R&D
groups, use negotiated joining—a previously undocumented process—to sys-
tematically construct and fill these emergent, open-ended roles. I show that
negotiated joining is a consistently patterned, iterative process that begins with
a role that both aspirant and target group explicitly understand to be provisional.
This provisional role is then jointly modified and constructed by the aspirant and
target group through repeated iterations of proposition, validation through trial
and evaluation, and selective integration of validated role components. The ini-
tially provisional role stabilizes and the aspirant achieves membership if enough
role components are validated; otherwise the negotiated joining process is
abandoned. Negotiated joining allows the aspirant and target group to learn if a
mutually desirable role is likely and, if so, to construct such a role. In addition,
the provisional roles in negotiated joining can support absorptive capacity by
allowing novel role components to enter target groups through aspirants’
efforts to construct stable roles for themselves, while the internal adjustment
involved in integrating newly validated role components can have the unin-
tended side effect of supporting adaptation by providing opportunities for the
groups to use these novel role components to modify their role structure and
goals to suit a changing and uncertain environment. Negotiated joining thus
reveals role ambiguity’s hitherto unexamined beneficial consequences and pro-
vides a foundation for a contingency theory of new-member acquisition.
Keywords: adaptation, membership processes, negotiated joining, role ambi-
guity, absorptive capacity, innovation, elite groups, culinary groups, uncertainty,
contingency theory
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Organizations cannot grow and develop without acquiring new members.
Existing theory frames the systematic acquisition of new members as a selec-
tion problem in which a target group chooses from a pool of aspirants to opti-
mize fit between the chosen aspirant and a predefined role (Jovanovic, 1979;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Ployhart and Schneider, 2002). But as organi-
zations face more uncertain external environments (Christensen, 1997; Lester
and Piore, 2004; Wheatley, 2006; Stark, 2009), systematic growth poses a chal-
lenge that existing theory cannot resolve. Existing theories based on selection
processes assume that organizations have or can develop predefined roles with
which to acquire new members. Because organizations operating in uncertain
environments often cannot fully predefine the roles their new members will
have to perform (reviewed in Singh, 2008), these roles are necessarily emer-
gent and open-ended. Consequently, existing theories cannot—and were not
intended to—fully address situations in which organizations must acquire new
members whose roles are open-ended or the dynamics of membership in elite
groups that must be staffed from elite aspirant pools and that face uncertain
future demands, for instance, partnership groups within professional service
firms, tenured faculty ranks within prestigious academic departments, and top
management teams within firms operating in rapidly changing industries.
These observations generate the broad question that motivates this study:
What systematic processes and practices do such organizations use to acquire
new members when their roles are open-ended and mostly non-predefined? I
answer that question by documenting the previously unexamined process of
negotiated joining in a setting in which external uncertainty often necessitates
open-ended roles for new members: elite groups working in cutting-edge, high-
end cuisine. I begin by examining previous research on selection and job defini-
tion to develop a theoretical framework for understanding how organizations
might construct and fill open-ended roles. I then present a process model of
negotiated joining and its distinctive characteristics, subprocesses and associ-
ated practices, and enabling conditions.
CONSTRUCTING AND FILLING EMERGENT, OPEN-ENDED ROLES
A member’s role in an organization consists of the functions he or she per-
forms: formal and established functions (the job specification), informal and
emergent functions, and self-defined and socially defined functions (Ilgen and
Hollenbeck, 1991; Ilgen, 1994). Selection theory assumes and prescribes that
new members’ roles are stable (Ilgen and Hollenbeck, 1991; Ilgen, 1994) and
that target groups create roles for new members before roles are matched
with aspirants (Jovanovic, 1979; Stewart and Carson, 1997; Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1999; Singh, 2008). Aspirants are assumed to select and apply for
the roles they want to perform in specific target groups (Granovetter, 1995;
Judge and Cable, 1997), and these target groups are assumed to acquire new
members by selecting for best fit from among the aspirants that they have
attracted (Jovanovic, 1979). This study concentrates solely on the latter: the
processes target groups use to systematically acquire new members.
In selection, the target group’s goal is to optimize two types of new-member
fit: cultural fit (O’Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell, 1991; Van Vianen, 2000) and
simple fit with a predefined role (Arthur et al., 2006). The greater the fit
between the selected individual and the predefined role, the more successful
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the target group is at selection. Selection is conceptualized as a linear process
of applying appropriate selection methods (summarized in Stewart and Carson,
1997; Schmidt and Hunter, 1998) to come to a selection decision. These selec-
tion methods cannot work without a predefined set of criteria for deciding
between aspirants to a given predefined role. Due to this fundamental require-
ment and assumption, research and theory in selection were not intended to—
and cannot—address situations in which roles are open-ended. Theories of
how jobs are defined and shaped, however, provide some limited insight into
how emergent, open-ended roles might be constructed and filled. Three per-
spectives in this area are particularly relevant: research on idiosyncratic jobs, on
job assembly, and on job crafting.
Idiosyncratic jobs. Selection has traditionally been presented as a
systematic, managerially driven, top-down process. Research on idiosyncratic
jobs offers an alternative view that encompasses two phenomena:
(1) opportunistic hiring into jobs specifically created to fit new members and
(2) evolution of incumbents’ jobs during their tenure (Miner and Estler, 1985;
Miner, 1987). These jobs are identified as idiosyncratic because they are highly
personalized and also because they result from individual action by hiring
managers (in the case of opportunistic hiring) and incumbents (in the case of
role evolution). Idiosyncratic jobs have been found to be associated with
increased mission ambiguity and resource uncertainty and are thought to be
the product of adaptive actions by managers and incumbents, possibly
representing ‘‘intelligent action in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity’’
(Miner, 1987: 334). This perspective suggests that open-ended roles can be
constructed not only from the top down by managers acting on behalf of the
firm but also from the bottom up by individuals acting out of self-interest
(Miner, 1990).
Job assembly. Whereas selection requires predefined integral roles, job-
assembly theory suggests that jobs are put together out of multiple tasks
(Cohen, 2012). These tasks can enter groups through active search and passive
reception; they can also be generated by the learning that occurs in the course
of work or be part of existing ideas about jobs. Job-assembly theory thus indi-
cates that job design is an ‘‘evolving response to the ebb and flow of informa-
tion and interactions’’ within organizations (Cohen, 2012: 450). This perspective
suggests that the construction of open-ended roles is likely to be an iterative
and evolutionary process operating on the components of roles rather than on
monolithic roles.
Job crafting. In contrast to the static roles that selection depends on,
job-crafting theory proposes that roles are plastic and can be shaped by role
incumbents. Research in this area documents how employees use interactions
with coworkers to modify the task, cognitive, and relational boundaries of
their prescribed jobs ‘‘to create work with which they are more satisfied’’
(Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001: 181). This perspective suggests that role con-
struction can be driven by individuals motivated to expend effort to modify their
roles to increase their satisfaction. It also indicates that a significant part of role
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construction happens through interactions and interpersonal sensemaking and
negotiation (Wrzesniewski, Dutton, and Debebe, 2003).
These three theoretical perspectives suggest that open-ended roles are
likely to be constructed and filled through iterative and evolutionary processes
that (1) operate on role components rather than on monolithic roles, (2) are
motivated by individuals’ desire for satisfying work, (3) are responsive to exter-
nal uncertainty and ambiguity, and (4) happen in the course of interpersonal
interaction. The interactive, constructive nature of these processes is consis-
tent with theories of organization around emergent relationships (Stewart and
Carson, 1997), of the continuous social interpretation of organizational compo-
nents such as roles (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005), and of
the potential for negotiation to generate novel social understandings interac-
tively (Mead, 1934; Strauss, 1978; Fine, 1984). Yet the extant research on job
crafting, job assembly, and idiosyncratic jobs remains insufficient to explain
how an organization that must construct and fill new open-ended roles can do
so systematically.
Existing research depicts emergent jobs as the product of individual, unco-
ordinated action without top-down organizational involvement (Miner, 1987,
1990), though the widespread nature of emergent roles in some settings sug-
gests that they can also result from systematic processes stemming from
intentional organizational action. Job assembly focuses on formal tasks, though
non-task role components (Parsons, 1956) are likely to be especially important
components of an individual’s role in a group facing high levels of external
uncertainty (Ilgen and Hollenbeck, 1991). Job crafting focuses on employees’
motivations and actions and tells us little about how job crafting affects (and is
affected by) other members and the group as a whole, though these contextual
effects are likely to be significant (Berg, Wrzesniewski, and Dutton, 2010).
Finally, all three perspectives consider only role-shaping actions taken by
employees who are already members of the organization, leaving aspirants out
of the picture.
This paper attempts to answer some questions left unasked by previous
research: What systematic processes do organizations use to acquire new
members when task and non-task components of their roles are open-ended,
not predefined? What processes allow these open-ended roles to be con-
structed and filled, and how do they affect the roles of both aspirants and
incumbents? And, finally, what practices are associated with these processes?
Such questions deal with poorly characterized processes and are best
addressed in settings in which the phenomena under investigation are likely to
be clearly observable (Pettigrew, 1990). This study therefore begins to answer
these questions in an unconventional setting (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010) in
which open-ended roles are the rule rather than the exception: elite groups
working in high-end, cutting-edge cuisine. Though these elite groups range
from small restaurant operating teams to culinary R&D labs, open-ended roles
are common to them all.
High-end, Cutting-edge Culinary Work
Among high-end culinary groups, innovation has become a key differentiating
factor and source of competitive advantage, the latest stage in the constantly
evolving identity work that has characterized the institutionalization of high-end
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culinary work in recent history (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). Because novel
output is now so important, the elite groups working in high-end, cutting-edge
cuisine invest considerable time and effort in innovation, often organizing their
operations and service models around research and development. These elite
groups work on creating new ingredients, cooking processes, and equipment,
with the intent of eventually creating new dishes and dining experiences
(Abend, 2011; Gopnik, 2011; Kramer, 2011).
Because their identity depends so much on being perceived as innovative,
these elite groups generate novel ideas rapidly. They must also constantly
respond to the work of competing groups to differentiate themselves and
reach and remain at the high end of the industry. As a senior chef at a
European restaurant said, ‘‘We’re not in a world where you can learn the tech-
niques and then coast for years anymore. Now there’s, like, something new to
have to think about every day. We’re running just to stay in place’’ (I-46).1 The
state of the art in this industry changes so quickly that demands placed on
these groups are unpredictable, making individual members’ roles difficult or
impossible to define in advance—an ideal setting in which to examine how
groups acquire new members with open-ended roles.
METHODS
This study focuses on how elite culinary groups—the target groups to which
potential members aspire—manage new-member acquisition from their
respective aspirant pools instead of how and why aspirants choose the particu-
lar target groups they apply to. Consequently, my unit of analysis is the joining
process through which a stable role was constructed for and by the aspirant or,
conversely, through which the target group and aspirant realized that a stable
role was unlikely. I treat each individual moving through this process at a partic-
ular group as a case, analyzing the narratives within each case (Dyer and
Wilkins, 1991) to describe similarities in the processes aspirants go through.
I developed the cases from in-depth, unstructured interviews with 88 individ-
uals working in high-end cuisine and more than a thousand hours of ethno-
graphic observation time spent with nine internationally renowned task-
oriented groups in North America and Europe working in high-end cuisine. In-
depth interviews and extended ethnographic observation (Becker et al., 1976;
Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Michel, 2011) and case study methodology (Yin, 2002;
George and Bennett, 2005) are appropriate for investigating and theorizing
about processes such as negotiated joining that are not yet thoroughly
researched (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). These cases incorporated per-
spectives from both the focal aspirant and multiple incumbents from the target
group, and the set of cases contained both cases that resulted in stable roles
for the aspirants and those that did not. This multi-perspective, multiple-case
analysis was an attempt to mitigate the tendency to misjudge the extent to
which a single case is generally representative (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).
1 I = an incumbent in a target group and A = an aspirant who hopes to join the target group; the
number following denotes an individual respondent in this study. I-46 is the 46th of 55 incumbents.
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Data Collection
I acquired respondents and observation sites using snowball referrals (as
described in Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981) from initial contacts who were promi-
nent in and familiar with the industry. I interviewed 88 respondents in total, in
many cases in multiple interviews. A few were dedicated interviews, but most
were real-time interviews conducted ad hoc in the course of work or casual
conversation (Barley and Kunda, 2001).
Interview times with respondents ranged from 45 minutes to over three
hours, and 33 respondents were prospective members (‘‘aspirants,’’ labeled
A-1 through A-33 in the following analysis), while 55 respondents were current
members of a group (‘‘incumbents,’’ labeled I-1 through I-55). Of the 33 aspir-
ants, 14 were stagiaires—people working temporary and usually unpaid stints
at observation sites. Respondents’ locations were about evenly divided
between North America (48) and Europe (40), and their gender and age makeup
was approximately representative of cutting-edge, high-end culinary groups: 74
respondents were male, and 68 were in their 20s and 30s (two were in their
late teens, and 18 were in their 40s and 50s).
I initially recorded interviews whenever my respondents permitted me to do
so, taking notes during the interview and transcribing selectively afterwards,
but I soon discovered that kitchen background noise made audio recordings of
interviews largely unusable. I eventually abandoned the recording apparatus
whenever I was interviewing someone in a working environment and relied
instead on pen-and-paper field notes or, at some sites, field notes written
directly into an on-site lab computer. I combined partial interview transcripts
(when available) with notes written up during and after interviews and analyzed
them for instances of joining. At several points in the analysis, I contacted
respondents to ask clarifying questions about the setting.
Over a four-year period, I gained research access to nine groups and visited
each group several times, each visit lasting between ten days and six weeks.
Table 1 summarizes information about these field sites, including observation
time spent at each location. Of the nine groups, five operated a single restau-
rant, two conducted R&D for restaurant groups, and two conducted R&D
independently—reflecting three distinct models of high-end, cutting-edge culin-
ary work.
I arranged my visits to coincide as much as possible with the presence of
aspirants at various points in the joining process. I spent more than a thousand
hours on site (approximately 14 working weeks of 14- to 18-hour days) obser-
ving these groups and their incumbents in the course of their work, in the pro-
cess of evaluating aspirants, and in their pre- and post-work social interactions.
Nearly every respondent had experience as both an aspirant and an incumbent.
Of the 33 respondents who were aspirants during my data collection, 32 were
working at field sites; I was able to observe them in the negotiated joining pro-
cess. Nineteen of them achieved a stable role at their respective sites, while
13 abandoned the process. As often as was possible, I spoke with both aspir-
ants and incumbents to obtain both perspectives about aspirants’ movements
through the negotiated joining process. While on site, I took digital photographs
and kept short-form notes in a notebook and on-site computer. I wrote nightly
long-form syntheses of field notes, weekly summaries, and analytic
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memoranda at the end of each field visit (approximately as described in
Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995).
Data Analysis and Reduction
Data coding and analysis occurred in tandem, in two major stages. The first
stage was connected to data collection. My fieldwork began as a series of in-
depth interviews from which I developed some retrospective cases—incum-
bents’ accounts of their previous experiences as aspirants. Preliminary analysis
of these cases revealed the unusually protracted nature of recruitment in these
groups. I then returned to the field over the course of four years to observe
recruitment processes in real time, focusing on data relating to the schemas
and frames emerging from the analysis of interview data. These first-stage
codes clustered around key themes emphasizing the importance of provisional
roles, the negotiated nature of stable roles, and the extended process of devel-
oping a role in a target group. I used this rough coding in the field as I collected
the observational data and conducted new interviews. While at these sites, I
continued to interview new respondents and re-interview previous respon-
dents. The cases I developed out of field observations and new interviews vali-
dated and added nuance to the retrospective cases.
I began the second stage of coding and analysis after completing fieldwork.
I reviewed the cases to identify similarities in process and practice across
them. From this, I produced a list of codes for the sequential subprocesses
(proposition, trial, evaluation, and integration) and associated practices
described below. My subsequent analysis of the patterning of these codes
across all cases revealed the sequential ordering of the subprocesses and the
iterative nature of negotiated joining as a whole process. At several points in
both stages of the analytic process, I asked people working in similar settings
Table 1. Observation Sites
Site name Description
Observation
time (approx.)
Bharat Peruano 15-person team running a restaurant featuring subregional cuisines from India and
Peru (U.S.).
130 hrs.
Montano 6-person team running a critically acclaimed high-end restaurant featuring
innovative multicourse tasting menus (U.S.).
130 hrs.
Rubicon 12-person team of chefs supporting development of menu items across 12
restaurants and new high-end restaurant concepts around the world (U.S.).
160 hrs.
Pacifica 6-person team running an established, critically acclaimed, small restaurant
featuring innovative, technical multicourse tasting menus (U.S.).
90 hrs.
Walsall 6-person team supporting a Michelin-starred restaurant and six other restaurants,
and content development for licensing deals, television, and books (Europe).
60 hrs.
Kerberos 22-person team running an R&D lab primarily developing content for books and
new media (U.S.).
75 hrs.
Erebus 3-person team running a culinary R&D lab with sporadic production and research
partnerships with industry and restaurants (Europe).
100 hrs.
Øresund 65-person team running a critically acclaimed, Michelin-starred restaurant featuring
innovative, technical multicourse tasting menus (Europe).
350 hrs.
Turnstone 28-person team running a critically acclaimed, Michelin-starred restaurant featuring
innovative, technical multicourse tasting menus (Europe).
50 hrs.
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who were not part of my respondent set to review and validate my analyses
and interpretations of interview and observational data.
NEGOTIATED JOINING
My findings document how negotiated joining allowed aspirants and target
groups to surmount two challenges that resulted from open-ended roles that
were mostly non-predefined. The first challenge was learning if a mutually
desirable role—a set of role components that the aspirant would find desirable
to undertake and that would satisfy the target group’s emerging set of needs—
was likely for a given aspirant–target group combination. The second challenge
was constructing such a mutually desirable, stable role. Negotiated joining had
distinctive characteristics, subprocesses and practices, and enabling
conditions.
Distinctive Characteristics
Aspirants had to apply to the target groups and be selected to participate in
negotiated joining. But respondents said that this initial selection process by
the target group involved a small set of selection criteria and that selection did
not mean that the aspirant had been hired into a permanent job. In fact, the
opposite was true: incumbents at every target group said that they screened
re´sume´s of potential aspirants with ‘‘some idea of what we’re looking for’’ but
needed to spend time working with the aspirant ‘‘to give us an opportunity to
find out more about him but also so that we give him time to learn about us
Table 2. Evidence for Distinctive Characteristics of Negotiated Joining*
Distinctive characteristic Evidence
Initially provisional roles ‘‘Of course [the new member’s role] is a bit floating, a bit [makes hand-waving
gesture]—I know a little bit what I want the new person to do but stuff happens
so fast around here that it’d be silly to try to put too much structure in at the
start. It’s better to wait and see.’’ (I-17)
Emphasis on learning whether a
mutually desirable eventual role
was likely
‘‘You have to figure out a job that you’re happy with that [the target group] is also
happy with. That’s the important thing about it. If you can’t make it work out,
it’s probably best to just move on.’’ (A-9)
Emphasis on constructed role fit ‘‘. . . it’s not like my previous job [in software product management] where once I
got the job I had pre-set expectations of what I needed to deliver and my bonus
was pegged to that. . . . here, to get the job I have to build it. [The target group]
doesn’t have a clear idea of what I can do for them, so I have to put that picture
together and really sell it.’’ (A-17)
Role construction occurred through
iterative role negotiation
‘‘You don’t figure it out straight away . . . it takes a while to try things out not only
for you but also for [the group] to see if you’re good at it. And of course if it’s
useful for them.’’ (A-29)
Abandonment of negotiated joining
framed as learning about
preferences
‘‘[A particular aspirant] left because we couldn’t figure out something for him to do
that he found worthwhile. . . . it was clear when we were working together that
he was good at the [R&D] part of things but it turned out that we couldn’t give
him enough [of that work] and he didn’t really enjoy [working] service enough to
make it worthwhile.’’ (I-12)
* I = incumbent, A = aspirant; the number following denotes an individual respondent in this study. Thus, I-17 is
the 17th of 55 incumbents.
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and tell us how he thinks he’ll fit in with what we do’’ (I-34). They described
selection in this setting as a precursor to ‘‘the real work of joining the group
and making a place for yourself’’ (I-10).
Target groups used this first selection process to choose aspirants to enter
a consistently patterned, systematic negotiated joining process with five dis-
tinctive characteristics: (1) aspirants’ initial roles were mutually explicitly
acknowledged to be provisional, (2) aspirants and target groups both empha-
sized the importance of learning whether a mutually desirable eventual role
was likely, (3) aspirants and target groups both emphasized the importance of
constructed role fit, (4) mutually desirable roles were constructed through itera-
tive rounds of role negotiation, and (5) both aspirants and target groups framed
abandoned negotiated joining processes as valuable learning experiences
instead of failures. Table 2 presents evidence for these key characteristics of
negotiated joining.
Roles explicitly and mutually acknowledged to be initially provisional.
Target groups recognized that they did not or could not know in advance the
complete set of functions they needed new members to perform.
Consequently, the aspirant’s initial role was meant to be a starting point rather
than the intended end state. Though the aspirant’s role was initially provisional,
it was neither completely undefined nor unintentionally undefined. Many
respondents described how a part of their eventual role was clearly defined
from the beginning. But even when there were specific expectations about an
aspirant’s eventual role, part of that role was explicitly and intentionally left
open to change or definition. Respondents said that both the aspirant and the
target group had to explicitly and intentionally acknowledge the initial role’s pro-
visionality for negotiated joining to take place. When this was not the case,
negotiated joining could not proceed: ‘‘. . . there wasn’t any flex for me to do
anything interesting . . . they knew what they wanted from me but I wasn’t into
it enough [for me] to want to stay’’ (A-1, recalling previous aspirant
experience).
Emphasis on learning about the likelihood of a mutually stable role. Because
roles were open-ended, neither aspirants nor target groups knew in advance
exactly what a new member’s role would be or if it would be mutually desirable.
Respondents said that an important aspect of negotiated joining was therefore
to learn whether a mutually desirable role was likely: ‘‘. . . there’s no way to
know for sure [if or what your stable role will be]; you have to be pro-active
and put some time into figuring out if [a particular target group] is the place for
you’’ (I-1).
A mutually desirable role was one the aspirant wanted to perform that was
also relevant and useful to the group. Aspirants highlighted the importance of
‘‘figuring out a job that is satisfying’’ (A-6), while incumbents highlighted the
importance of ‘‘making sure that [the aspirant] brings something useful to the
table’’ (I-30). Crucially, a role had to fulfill both criteria simultaneously to be
mutually desirable and thus stable: many respondents echoed one incumbent’s
explanation that ‘‘what’s important . . . is getting to the point where [both the
group and the aspirant] know that we’ve got a good thing going’’ (I-22).
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Emphasis on constructed role fit in addition to simple role fit and cul-
tural fit. Respondents said that negotiated joining helped them identify both
cultural fit and simple fit with predefined roles: ‘‘. . . spending time working
together is essential to see if we can work together, if [the aspirant] works in
the same way that we do’’ (I-11). But they emphasized that constructed role fit
was the most important part of negotiated joining. Respondents described their
roles as modular assemblages of role components and ‘‘figuring out a role’’ as
involving putting role components together to produce a mutually desirable role
(I-2). These roles were thus tailored to both the aspirant and the target group.
These role components were sometimes novel to the group but could also be
modifications of existing role components that were then assembled into novel
configurations. Negotiated joining allowed aspirants and target groups to pro-
pose and validate both novel role components and novel configurations of exist-
ing role components. Respondents said that most of the stable roles
constructed were novel in that each stable role was the first instance of that
particular configuration of role components in the target group. For example,
one incumbent, describing a colleague’s role, said,
[He’s] the first sous chef we’ve ever had who spends so much time managing our
[hundreds of] supplier relationships . . . he spends very little time in the [service]
kitchen compared to the other sous [chefs]. At first [the head chef] didn’t think it
would be worth it to spend a person on this job but he just started doing the work
anyway and it quickly became obvious that having one person manage all of [the sup-
pliers] makes a huge difference. (I-36)
This role combined new and existing role components in a configuration novel
to the group, and the role was stable because it was both personally satisfying
to the aspirant who eventually filled it and relevant to the group’s goals.
Role construction through iterative rounds of mutual role negotiation.
Respondents said that aspirants’ roles gradually accumulated out of only vali-
dated role components over the course of multiple rounds of negotiation. Role
negotiation was consistently described as a mutual process that operated
through routine work interactions, with the aspirant acting to ‘‘show [the target
group] that you’re good enough to perform [a particular role component]’’ (I-52)
and the target group acting to evaluate the aspirant’s performance of that role
component and ‘‘see if [the role component] is useful [to the target group]’’
(I-2). When aspirants I observed managed to construct a stable role (19 cases
out of 32), the role only stabilized after repeated sequences of negotiation,
most of which resulted in a validated role component that was then incorpo-
rated into the aspirant’s stable role.
Abandonment of negotiated joining framed as a learning experience. In
13 of the 32 cases, the negotiated joining process was abandoned after a
sequence of mostly unsuccessful attempts to negotiate role components—in
12 of these 13 cases, the aspirant made the decision to abandon the process.
Eighty-three out of 88 respondents said that they had gone through negotiated
joining at least once in their careers, and those who had been in the industry
longer said that they had abandoned multiple negotiated joining processes.
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Across all respondents, however, these abandoned negotiated joining pro-
cesses were not framed as failures. Instead, respondents reported that aban-
doned negotiated joining processes allowed them to learn about their skills and
inclinations as well as the types of groups they would likely be happy in. A
senior incumbent with extensive industry experience said that ‘‘you can only
learn about the work you want to do by trying it out. Most of the time, it’s not
quite right . . . you have to be disciplined about learning what you can from the
situation and moving on’’ (I-16). This was also true from the target group’s per-
spective: ‘‘. . . even after years of doing this we still don’t know what kind of
person will work well here. . . . So you have to keep an open mind as a [group].
But the more people come through, the more we know about what kind of per-
son probably won’t work so well here’’ (I-52).
Both aspirants and incumbents said that they interpreted abandonment of
negotiated joining as indicating either (1) poor fit with the target group’s exist-
ing culture or with predefined role expectations or (2) that the aspirant and/or
the target group believed that no mutually desirable role could be constructed:
I went into [a previous target group] knowing that they were trying to build an R&D
team but weren’t sure exactly what kind of work they were trying to do. While I was
there, we tried [a few different approaches] but in the end the only things [that
turned out to be viable for them] were things that I found fundamentally uninterest-
ing. (A-18, describing an earlier abandoned negotiated joining process)
Respondents said that selection was relatively unimportant in this context
compared with negotiated joining. Moreover, selection could not be substituted
for negotiated joining because it was impossible to fully or mostly predefine a
new member’s role:
. . . when they hired [a new R&D head from a traditional R&D management back-
ground], he asked us all to write out detailed job descriptions to streamline opera-
tions and become more efficient. That’s when everything really began to go to shit.
It’s very satisfying at first to have these long lists of roles and responsibilities. It defi-
nitely feels very efficient and like you’re getting something done. But does it work in
real life? No. There’s no point being efficient and hiring for a very detailed job descrip-
tion if the job changes every day. That’s being efficient about the wrong things. (I-37)
Respondents consistently reported that negotiated joining was an iterative
process—distinct from selection—that mediated the transformation of an ini-
tially provisional role into a stable, mutually desirable one, or the discovery that
no stable role was likely. My analysis revealed the subprocesses, practices,
and enabling conditions of negotiated joining.
For aspirants, negotiated joining was experienced at any given moment as
potential involvement in and resolution of multiple role-component negotia-
tions. This role negotiation consisted of and was interwoven with the daily rou-
tines of work. Through work interactions like preparing a consomme´,
butchering a fish, jumping in during a busy service, volunteering to do inven-
tory, and countless others, aspirants and incumbents engaged in a constant
stream of negotiations about various role components—some concrete, some
abstract, some major, some minor.
Negotiated joining entailed four conceptually distinct subprocesses that
were consistently patterned and sequentially ordered and were associated with
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Table 3. Evidence for Practices Associated with Negotiated Joining Subprocesses
Practice Evidence
Proposition
Problematizing routine work ‘‘. . . the best thing to do is to keep thinking about problems. . . . It’s about training
yourself to have that mindset of looking at everything [the target group is doing] and
seeing past the routine. . . . that’s your chance to show us that you can make our
kitchen work better.’’ (I-17)
Integrating aspirants into
incumbent workflows
‘‘. . . it’s hard not to notice if someone is really good or bad at doing something [if you’re
working in the same room]. Like, [a particular stagiaire] is a complete mess. . . . all
the wrong instincts for service. . . . But he’s actually really useful if there’s a question
like, I don’t know, how do I make this foam more stable? We were working on
something like that the other day and he’s got an instinct for that stuff.’’ (I-30)
Trial
Clearly stated trial parameters ‘‘. . . [trials] work best when it’s clear what you’re testing. [As an aspirant] I figured out
quickly to set up [the trial] so that it’s obvious what I’m doing and how it’s affecting
the result . . . if I’m going to be evaluated for something, it better be the right thing.’’
(I-25)
Scheduling frequent and
routine trial opportunities
‘‘I feel a lot more comfortable bringing stuff for feedback [when everyone is planning to
be there anyway]. It helps that [the feedback session] doesn’t feel like a super special
thing where the stakes are high.’’ (A-24)
Evaluation
Using mutually understood
evaluation standards
A-30 has been asked to work on developing a sauce for a new dish. I-37 tells A-30 to
focus on the texture of a sauce he is developing: ‘‘Remember that egg custard [the
pastry chef made] last week? Aim for that kind of texture.’’ As A-30 worked, he could
rapidly eliminate many development pathways from consideration because he had an
accurate and precise idea—from a shared experience of the desired evaluation
standard—of the desired outcome. (Field notes from observation at a European
restaurant)
Large group evaluations The role component A-33 was trialing during service was his ability to execute many
orders accurately under time and psychological pressure. At the post-service
debriefing, the head chef’s evaluation of A-33’s performance was that it was ‘‘a
disaster,’’ due to his lack of ‘‘awareness of [the progression of] service.’’ During the
large group debriefing, other incumbents provided information the head chef did not
have about mitigating circumstances beyond A-33’s control—this changed the group’s
prevailing interpretation of his performance to a potentially favorable one. (Field notes
from observation at a European restaurant)
Involving focal and non-focal
participants in evaluations
‘‘. . . having other [non-focal] people [in the group] be part of the feedback process is
very useful . . . [because they can] see what kinds of questions we’re asking and
what the mindset and our priorities are when we’re trying to refine a recipe. That’s
hard to learn except by failing and watching other people fail.’’ (I-17)
Integration
Gradual commitment ‘‘It’s not a ‘you’re in, you’re out’ situation [with this role component]. It’s got to be baby
steps. This last batch of recipes tested out but if [the head chef] asked me to go out
now and do these on my own I wouldn’t be confident.’’ (A-29)
Having as many incumbents
as possible attend
evaluations
‘‘I always make people come to group feedback sessions if they are in [the restaurant]. .
. . You can’t learn if you’re not present and if you don’t learn, you can’t change how
you do your job.’’ (I-49)
Having non-focal incumbents
participate in evaluations
‘‘. . . when you have to give feedback on someone, you can’t just say ‘I like it’ or ‘That
sucks.’ Gotta give reasons, you know, justifications . . . having to explain why
something [the aspirant] did is good or bad, it helps convince other people in the
group . . . and it makes you think harder about the feedback too.’’ (I-6)
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specific practices: (1) the proposition of role components, validation of pro-
posed role components through (2) practical trial, followed by (3) evaluation of
trial results, and (4) selective integration of only validated role components into
the aspirant’s role. The process moved through the subprocesses in sequence,
each iteration potentially adding validated role components to the aspirant’s
role. The iterations continued until a mutually desirable role was constructed or
the aspirant decided to abandon the process and leave the group. Table 3 pre-
sents evidence for the four subprocesses and their associated practices.
Subprocess: Proposition
Problematizing routine work. In the initial stage of each iteration of negoti-
ated joining, either the aspirant or the target group developed and then pro-
posed a role component that might—conditional on successful testing,
evaluation, and integration—become part of the aspirant’s eventual role.
Aspirants were motivated to develop and propose relevant role components
out of a desire to convert an initially provisional role into a stable one, thus
obtaining membership in a personally aspirational group. Respondents said that
a role component that was relevant to the target group was more likely to be
validated and contribute to the aspirant obtaining membership: ‘‘. . . it would be
great to [work] here but it can’t just be like a lame job, yeah? It has to be some-
thing that keeps me excited but it has to work for them too’’ (A-5).
Respondents reported that aspirants who were in the habit of problematizing
the target group’s system of routines and norms were more likely to see func-
tional gaps in their target groups and were thus able to identify more relevant
role components to propose. Respondents also said that role components could
emerge serendipitously: ‘‘. . . [my present role] is just how we split up the work,
and then we realized it was working quite well and . . . we kept on splitting up
the work the same way’’ (I-34). Interactions during routine work allowed aspir-
ants and incumbents to identify and propose role components like these.
Integrating aspirants into incumbent workflows. At the three sites where
incumbents and aspirants worked in close proximity (though rarely interdepen-
dently), incumbents seemed to propose role components for aspirants more fre-
quently than at the three sites where incumbents’ and aspirants’ workflows were
not as well-integrated. The more interaction, the more opportunities incumbents
had to observe aspirants working, identify potential role components, and pro-
pose them for specific aspirants: ‘‘. . . if I see that [a particular aspirant] is rocking
out [a particular set of tasks], I’m going to keep sending them his way’’ (I-49).
Constant interaction also encouraged aspirants to present their abilities honestly:
respondents said that being closely observed was ‘‘not a situation where you can
try to pretend to be good at doing something because you’re going to get called
on it’’ (A-29). Aspirants in highly integrated workflows were thus more likely to
act in ways that would allow incumbents to make well-informed role propositions
for them. The practice of integrating aspirants into incumbents’ workflows thus
appeared to support effective incumbent-driven role proposition for aspirants.
Many role components proposed for or by aspirants were already performed
by incumbents, but aspirants sometimes proposed role components that were
entirely novel to the target group. For instance, I observed an aspirant (A-3) at a
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U.S. restaurant use his previous work experience to propose a role component
as the group’s first bread-and-yeast specialist. These novel role components
sometimes had broader implications for other incumbents and the group as a
whole—as I discuss below in describing the integration subprocess—but the
end result of the proposition subprocess was that a role component was pro-
posed either for or by the aspirant. This initiated the next subprocess in negoti-
ated joining: practical testing of the proposed role component.
Subprocess: Trial
Proposed role components were validated in action, through trial and evaluation
of the aspirant’s performance of the role component in the context of group
work and group goals. Trials of role components took many forms but nearly
always looked ‘‘just like regular work’’ (I-14). Any work interaction could func-
tion as a trial if it simultaneously provided an opportunity to evaluate an aspir-
ant’s performance of a role component and the aspirant and target group
incumbents treated it as a trial to be evaluated. Trials were either implicit or
explicit: a junior and a senior chef working on a fish soup recipe deciding to
compare their preferred methods of clarifying fish stock to see which one
worked better (an implicit trial observed at a European restaurant), or a junior
chef demonstrating to more senior colleagues what he asserted was a more
efficient method of filling a large number of micro-pipettes with aromatized oil
(an explicit trial observed at a U.S. restaurant group). In both cases, the interac-
tion served both the task at hand (clarifying stock or filling pipettes) and evalua-
tion of a proposed role component.
Practical trials of role components allowed the aspirant and the target
group to learn about the performance of a proposed role component through
concrete experience instead of mere assertion. Consequently, target groups
could and did use them to evaluate an aspirant’s fit with a predefined role.
But trials performed more than just this selection-oriented function: they were
also used by the target group as a source of information about those aspirants’
suitability for novel role components or novel configurations of role
components.
Clearly stated trial parameters. Trials were rife with misunderstandings.
Aspirants and target group incumbents didn’t always share the same assump-
tions about when a work interaction was a trial and when it was not.
Respondents often mentioned aspirants who ‘‘weren’t treating [the work] as a
chance to prove that they’re capable’’ (I-5) and viewed these as ‘‘wasted oppor-
tunities’’ on the part of the aspirants concerned (A-4). Also, aspirants and
incumbents did not always have the same understanding about the nature of
the role component being tested: ‘‘I always try to be clear about what the point
[of the trial] is but sometimes it just doesn’t get across [to the aspirant]’’ (I-9,
commenting on a just-completed trial). Aspirants and incumbents both said that
making the effort to clearly state trial parameters reduced the occurrence of
both types of misunderstandings.
Scheduling frequent and routine trial opportunities. Frequent, routinely
scheduled trial opportunities seemed to reduce aspirants’ perceived and actual
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barriers to committing to a trial of a role component—this practice seemed to
increase the total number of trials each aspirant undertook and accelerate the
trial subprocess. Five of the nine sites had weekly recurring meetings during
which all aspirants and incumbents would meet regardless of whether any
trials had been prearranged, and any aspirant or incumbent could bring work
(such as a prototype of a recipe under development) to these meetings for
feedback from other attendees. An aspirant in one of these groups said that
‘‘the bar for showing something [for feedback] seems low. Everyone’s going
to come [to the session] anyway and lots of other people are showing stuff
too . . . there’s not much pressure’’ (A-1). In contrast, aspirants at the other
four sites had to organize trials ad hoc. Respondents at these latter sites said
that the logistical challenges of scheduling a trial and ‘‘getting [all the incum-
bents together] to give feedback [on a trial] is a massive pain in the ass’’ (A-30).
They were consequently more reluctant to propose and test role components
and seemed to do so less frequently.
Subprocess: Evaluation
Evaluation was conceptually distinct from trial even though the two subpro-
cesses could (and often did) occur at the same time: evaluation entailed target
group incumbents interpreting a trial’s outcome and assigning meaning and
value to it. This interpretive process required incumbents to come to an agree-
ment about the aspirant’s competence at the role component.
Using mutually understood evaluation standards. Evaluation was
straightforward when aspirants and incumbents both shared the same under-
standing of the standards by which the trial performance would be evaluated,
for instance, when an aspirant and an incumbent agreed to use a liqueur they
had both sampled together previously as the standard for the acid–sugar bal-
ance of a new sauce on which the aspirant would be working (observed at a
U.S. restaurant). Using mutually understood standards for evaluating trial per-
formance seemed to significantly enhance an aspirant’s ability to iterate rapidly
toward a desired output for any given trial and thus to improve a trial’s accuracy
in testing a particular role component. Nonetheless, this practice was the
exception rather than the rule—I observed it frequently at only one of the nine
field sites.
Role components with more abstract standards for performance required
more interpretive work. An aspirant said that ‘‘it’s not like . . . seeing if some-
one can break down [into usable pieces] a side of beef. I couldn’t tell you what
it means to have an R&D mindset like what [the senior incumbent in the group]
says we all need to have. I don’t think he could tell you either. It all depends on
what the specific problem is that we’re trying to solve. So it’s also hard to
show [the incumbents] that you have what it takes to do the job’’ (A-9). The
related practices of holding large group evaluations and debriefings and of
involving both focal and non-focal participants in trial evaluations were espe-
cially useful for trials of abstract role components.
Large group evaluations. Evaluating more abstract role components
required incumbents to accumulate multiple pieces of confirming or
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disconfirming evidence of competence: ‘‘you can’t tell about these things from
just a few [trials]. It takes time . . . you have to see if they always perform the
same way in similar situations’’ (incumbent, chef at a U.S. restaurant).
Incumbents also had to deliberate interactively and collectively assign meaning
and value to trial outcomes for more abstract role components. For instance, all
the senior incumbents with R&D responsibilities at a particular target group
debated at length a particular aspirant’s ability to ‘‘develop new recipes in the
spirit [of the group]’’; these debates took place through a series of discussions,
each associated with one of a series of dishes the aspirant developed and pre-
sented for tasting and feedback over the course of a few weeks (observed in a
European restaurant). Collective deliberation allowed incumbents to obtain and
synthesize disparate perspectives and pieces of information on the aspirant’s
performance.
Involving focal and non-focal participants. Evaluations usually took the
form of discussions of events that had taken place during service or feedback
sessions on particular dishes, and they involved up to four possible types of
participants: focal incumbents (who were primarily responsible for giving eva-
luations), focal aspirants (whose work was being evaluated), and non-focal
incumbents and aspirants (who were peripheral to the particular trial being
evaluated). Evaluation sessions consisted, at a minimum, of focal aspirants
and focal incumbents. But sessions that also involved non-focal incumbents
(three of the four types of participants) allowed information from more
incumbents’ perspectives to be incorporated into the evaluation. This
seemed to permit more complete evaluations of the focal aspirant’s perfor-
mance. Group evaluations that also included non-focal aspirants (i.e., all four
possible types of participants) were even more useful: respondents said that
participating in these sessions allowed non-focal aspirants to better under-
stand the target group’s work practices and approach, which improved their
ability to propose mutually desirable role components for themselves. These
latter two practices also supported the integration of newly validated role
components.
Subprocess: Integration
Integration of a validated role component occurred at three levels: that of the
aspirant, the incumbent, and the group as a whole. Integration of an aspirant’s
role component sometimes resulted in unintended but profound changes to
the target group’s goals and role structure.
Aspirant-level integration: Working out parameters of a role
component. Respondents said that even after role components were vali-
dated by evaluation, it ‘‘could take a while’’ (I-10) for aspirants to learn the para-
meters of a particular role component—the range of situations in which an
aspirant was expected to perform that role component. This was particularly
true for more abstract role components.
Gradual commitment. Aspirants integrated these abstract role components
voluntarily, initiating additional trials of the role component in situations of
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increasingly significant consequence; in other words, additional iterations of
negotiated joining for the same role component. Aspirants described these
additional trials in similar ways: ‘‘baby steps’’ (A-29), ‘‘keeping the training
wheels on for now’’ (A-14), and ‘‘easing in’’ (A-3). One aspirant said,
I have to come up with dishes that channel [this restaurant’s] ethos but are creative
and new at the same time. It would be dumb to imagine that having [the head chef]
be excited about the three or four dishes I’ve come up with [in the last few weeks]
means I’m now ready to fly solo. . . . I’m going to keep doing more small projects. I
have to slowly get a feel for [this group] . . . and they have to get used to my particu-
lar sensibility in food. (A-29)
This gradual commitment gave the aspirant and target group more opportuni-
ties to test a role component under different circumstances—this generated
more reliable information for the target group about the aspirant’s competence
and more information for the aspirant about the circumstances under which
that role component might be applicable.
Incumbent-level integration: Modifications to incumbents’ roles. Incumbents’
roles almost always changed when a role component was allocated to an aspir-
ant. Respondents consistently said, and I observed, that they took it for granted
that incumbents’ roles were only relatively stable and might change at short
notice due to an aspirant’s role negotiations. They took considerable pride in
how their roles were constantly in flux and how, as one incumbent put it, ‘‘you
have to stay on your toes in this business’’ (I-33).
When an aspirant was allocated a role component already performed by
incumbents, those incumbents either relinquished that role component or
shared responsibility for it with the aspirant. The evidence of competence pro-
duced by the proposition–trial–evaluation sequence was crucial to this integra-
tion and adjustment. Incumbents said that such responsibility transfers were
usually non-contentious because the aspirant’s competence was demonstrated
through practical trial: ‘‘the nice thing is that we can all see if [the aspirant] is
better than we are at something or not. [Having gone through a series of trials
and evaluations, we know] she’s got the chops to take on [a role component I
currently claim]. I respect that’’ (I-6).
Having as many incumbents as possible—including non-focal incumbents—
attend evaluations. Respondents said that having as many incumbents as pos-
sible attend trial evaluations promoted integration by quickly spreading person-
ally verified knowledge about aspirants’ competence at specific role
components among incumbents. Respondents also said that the practice dis-
cussed earlier of non-focal incumbents participating in trial evaluations sup-
ported integration because it forced incumbents to justify their interpretations
of an aspirant’s trial performance both to themselves and others, producing
greater consensus in evaluation among incumbents. These two practices also
supported adjustments by incumbents when the allocated role component was
new to the group. For instance, an aspirant who demonstrated a more effective
and reliable way to modify the surface texture of cooked vegetables immedi-
ately prompted several members of the group to change the sets of tasks they
routinely performed to prepare ingredients for each day’s service because
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some of those tasks had been rendered obsolete by the aspirant’s new tech-
nique (observed at a restaurant in Europe).
Aspirants with industry experience were often said to bring in role compo-
nents representing incremental process or conceptual innovations that stimu-
lated adjustment within the group. But respondents distinguished these
incremental innovations from the much-rarer disruptive innovations ‘‘from way
out in left field . . . [that] profoundly, fundamentally changed how we worked’’
(I-49). Role components representing non-incremental innovations, respon-
dents said, were more likely to come from aspirants who had work experience
outside the culinary field (i.e., who were less experienced in terms of culinary
skill but not necessarily always younger).
Group-level integration: Adaptation and change. For disruptive role com-
ponents, respondents said that integration and adjustment occurred not just
among aspirants and incumbents but for the group as a whole. This unintended
but widely recognized side effect of negotiated joining was generated by aspir-
ants when they managed either implicitly or explicitly to persuade incumbents
that the group’s existing system of goals and roles was suboptimal for the
external environment and that the integration of the aspirant’s disruptive role
component (with attendant adjustments to incumbents’ roles and group goals)
would be a change for the better. One incumbent echoed a majority of respon-
dents when he told me that ‘‘[aspirants] sometimes come up with things that
we would never have thought of ourselves that somehow are just right for
what we like . . . sometimes, spending time with these new people who might
join our team, it helps us to understand that they can bring us where we don’t
even know we want to go yet’’ (I-52).
Incumbents framed these disruptive role components as new resources that
could be combined with existing group resources in ways that had been previ-
ously inconceivable. It was a rare aspirant who brought in this type of role com-
ponent that let the group ‘‘solve a problem that we didn’t know was good to
solve before’’ (I-52), but nearly every senior incumbent could recall at least one
instance of such a major change. For instance, an incumbent at a U.S. R&D lab
reported that an aspirant’s set of newly assigned role components triggered ‘‘a
new way of thinking that changed the way we thought about what we do as a
group. Suddenly, we had [someone on the team who was a Ph.D.-trained phy-
sicist and chemist] and we could imagine working on things that needed that
specialized knowledge’’ (I-2).
Because novel role components introduced by aspirants could fundamentally
change group goals, respondents said that integration in these situations could
be radical and affect many or even all incumbents in the group: ‘‘[Having a new
person on the team like this] forces you to re-think your job. . . . [A current
aspirant], for instance, is doing some biz dev for us. If he comes on board, we’ll
be all about partnering to develop new products or starting a restaurant, but we
were researchers before that so now we’re wondering how we can still be rel-
evant, what our new jobs should be’’ (I-15). This adaptation was possible only
because of the incumbent-centric adjustment and integration process and the
assumption that a new member’s entry would likely trigger reconfiguration of
incumbents’ roles.
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A PROCESS THEORY OF NEGOTIATED JOINING
Negotiated joining consisted of proposition, trial, evaluation, and integration—
four separate subprocesses associated with specific practices that, in
sequence, allowed aspirants and target groups to mutually propose and vali-
date role components, allocate them to aspirants, and integrate them into the
existing role structure of the target groups.
Figure 1. The iterative negotiated joining process, showing aspirant’s initial state,
subprocesses, decision points, and aspirant’s possible outcome states.*
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An aspirant’s progress through negotiated joining—both through the subpro-
cesses of each iteration and through multiple iterations of the whole process—
depended on decisions made at three points. The first occurred after evalua-
tion, when the aspirant and the target group had to decide if the role compo-
nent (and the aspirant’s performance of it) was mutually acceptable. The
second occurred after integration, when again both had to decide if the aspir-
ant’s role had become stable and mutually satisfactory with the addition of the
new role component. If the aspirant’s role had not yet stabilized, both aspirant
and target group had to make a third decision: whether the aspirant would
remain in negotiated joining and initiate another iteration or abandon the pro-
cess. Figure 1 illustrates the entire iterative negotiated joining process and
shows the relationship between the subprocesses and the decision points in
negotiated joining.
Selectively retaining only validated role components resulted in roles that
were stable because they comprised role components that both the aspirant
and the target group wanted the aspirant to perform: good role fit due not only
to accurate selection by the target group (simple role fit) but also to a mutual
process of role negotiation and role construction (constructed role fit). The
undefined part of the aspirant’s role gained definition and stabilized as it ‘‘filled
up’’ with validated role components. Yet even these roles were considered sta-
ble only in relation to aspirants’ initially provisional roles: incumbents said that it
was normal for them to adjust their roles to integrate aspirants’ newly validated
roles, and I observed this continual adjustment among incumbents at every
field site.
Enabling Conditions
Negotiated joining was universally said to be costly in time and effort for both
aspirants and target groups. It was also potentially fraught: aspirants and
incumbents had to work together for extended periods to construct aspirants’
roles and adjust incumbents’ roles, which should have resulted in turf battles
between incumbents and aspirants. But respondents’ accounts and my obser-
vations suggested that negotiated joining was used at all sites for all aspirants
despite its high cost and was regarded as unexceptional both at my field sites
and in the industry as a whole. Moreover, extended role negotiation provoked
few serious interpersonal or role-related conflicts. Though respondents all
regarded negotiated joining as unsurprising, it seems reasonable to wonder
what motivated aspirants and target groups to go through such an uncertain,
time- and effort-intensive job search process, and how groups using negotiated
joining managed to avoid collapsing under the burden of role-related conflict.
Three conditions seemed to enable negotiated joining in this setting: (1) expli-
citly provisional initial roles, (2) framing outcomes as personal choices, and
(3) prevailing norms and expectations.
Explicitly and mutually acknowledging the provisionality of initial
roles. Role conflict can arise when an aspirant’s expectations about his or her
role are violated or when an incumbent’s expectations about an aspirant’s role
are violated. The explicit provisionality of the aspirant’s role minimized these
expectations and seemed to remove this major potential source of conflict. A
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senior incumbent said that ‘‘people don’t get in a pissing contest about [the
roles they perform] when they don’t really know what they’re supposed to be
doing yet’’ (I-50). Provisionality also motivated the aspirant—respondents said
that the possibility of a stable eventual role combined with the explicitly provi-
sional nature of the initial role prompted aspirants to invest time and effort in
negotiated joining processes.
Framing negotiated joining outcomes as personal choice. Respondents
said that those who chose high-end culinary work generally had greater ambi-
tion and more advanced skills, giving them multiple employment options: ‘‘any
one of the stagiaires we have working for free tonight could go off and run a
kitchen at some two-bit club and make way more [money]. But they’re doing
this because they want something more, right?’’ (I-38). Respondents consis-
tently said that their top priority was ‘‘doing work worth doing in a restaurant
worth working in’’ (A-27) and that ‘‘once you get used to [working with people
of this quality] you can’t go back’’ (I-39). Consequently, they only described
themselves as having significant attachment to roles that they had validated as
being mutually desirable and were frequently ‘‘willing to walk away if it’s not
the right place’’ (I-43). Respondents treated the considerable time and effort
they spent on negotiated joining at various target groups as a worthwhile
investment in eventually creating the right role for themselves there or else-
where. This framing converted what might have been a point of interpersonal
conflict—invalidation of a previously desired role or role component— into a
less-conflictual personal choice.
Professional norms and expectations. Probably the main enabling condi-
tion in this setting is that high-end, cutting-edge culinary groups and workers
are part of a community of practice in which the norm is for aspirants’ roles to
be provisional and in which recruitment is almost universally managed through
negotiation-dominant joining processes. My respondents thus used negotiated
joining by convention, not by choice, generating the two enabling conditions
explained above. Incumbents and aspirants both said that investing time and
effort in negotiated joining was not seen as a deliberate decision but simply
‘‘how things are done in [this industry]’’ (I-22).
DISCUSSION
Previous studies take selection into predefined roles as the default model for
systematically acquiring new members, consequently regarding incompletely
predefined roles and other apparent departures from selection as idiosyncratic
(Miner, 1987) or even irrational (Khurana, 2004). The groups I observed faced
external uncertainty; their new members’ roles were necessarily open-ended,
and these groups therefore could not and did not depend solely on selection
processes to acquire new members. But the unsystematic, irrational, individua-
listic opportunistic hiring by managers predicted by previous theory did not
ensue. On the contrary, these groups managed the acquisition of new mem-
bers systematically using an iterative process new to the literature: negotiated
joining.
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The characteristics of negotiated joining described earlier reveal that it is dis-
tinct from selection as currently theorized. Table 4 summarizes these differ-
ences. Nonetheless, negotiated joining was systematic, consistently patterned,
and allowed groups to achieve constructed role fit for new members with
open-ended roles. While the pattern of practices associated with negotiated
joining in elite culinary groups reported here is setting-specific and unlikely to
generalize, the underlying negotiated joining process has broader applicability
for managing membership in elite groups.
Generalizability
Negotiated joining’s distinctive characteristics and enabling conditions suggest
that it is more likely to be observed where target groups and aspirants recog-
nize that roles must be emergent and open-ended. This is the case for groups
that experience external uncertainty, which makes members’ roles difficult to
predefine. Additionally, aspirants and target groups must be willing and able to
allocate large amounts of time and effort to role negotiation. Large payoffs from
group membership allow groups to have surplus resources to spend on negoti-
ated joining and also incentivize aspirants to attempt to join these groups.
Similarly, high-quality aspirants who are in short supply are more likely to be
able to invest time and effort in negotiated joining, and groups are more likely
to be incentivized to invest resources in constructing roles around them.
These three conditions—necessarily open-ended roles, large payouts from
group membership, and high-quality aspirants in short supply—characterize
elite groups that must be staffed from elite-aspirant pools and that face uncer-
tain future demands. Groups in this category include prestigious academic
faculties seeking high-quality scholars for tenure, professional service firms
seeking new equity partners, and top management teams in new or rapidly
changing industries seeking new senior management. The process theory
developed here suggests that these elite internal groups are likely to acquire
new members from their aspirant pools using negotiation-dominant processes
marked by initially provisional roles and iterative role-negotiation through propo-
sition, trial, evaluation, and integration.
By the same reasoning, negotiated joining is too costly and uncertain to be
the primary mode of new-member acquisition in all contexts. Groups with pre-
definable roles operating in relatively stable environments, with minimal
Table 4. Negotiated Joining Contrasted with Selection, from the Target Group’s Perspective
Negotiated joining Selection
Initial role Provisional and open-ended. Stable and predefined.
Objective Figure out if mutually desirable role is likely
and, if so, construct it.
Hire best-fitting aspirant to fill predefined
role.
Types of fit desired Constructed role fit, as well as cultural fit
and simple role fit.
Cultural fit and simple role fit.
Method Role construction through iterative role
negotiation.
Linear selection against predefined criteria.
Successful outcomes Learning about fit preferences;
constructing a mutually desirable role.
Hiring aspirant with a good fit with
predefined role.
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organizational slack, and with an abundance of qualified aspirants—for instance,
groups performing basic customer service work (e.g., Fernandez and Sosa,
2005) or manufacturing assembly work (e.g., Hossfeld, 1993)—have neither
the capacity nor the incentive to use negotiated joining. Selection-dominant pro-
cesses are both more appropriate and more likely to be observed in such
settings.
Contributions
Membership dynamics in elite groups. Current research in this area
focuses on group, individual, and role characteristics that predict membership
(Rivera, 2012, 2014) and subsequent member performance (Groysberg, Lee,
and Nanda, 2008; Groysberg and Lee, 2009) in elite groups. My findings show
that this research agenda should be expanded to also examine the processes
and dynamics that lead to membership in internal elite groups. The example of
management consulting firms is illustrative. While these consulting firms are
usually considered elite organizations in their own right (Rivera, 2014), equity
partnership groups within these firms represent an even more exclusive type
of group. Equity partners have relatively stable roles and domains of expertise;
by contrast, pre-partnership employees have provisional roles (they are
employed understanding that they either move ‘‘up or out’’) and should be con-
sidered potential aspirants to partnership. Negotiated joining helps make sense
of the pre-partnership trajectory, in which an aspirant must develop a ‘‘plat-
form’’ for election to partnership: domain expertise comprising a unique config-
uration of role components and individual client relationships that takes
advantage of the aspirant’s skills and inclinations and is relevant to the firm’s
needs. These role components are validated through multiple client engage-
ments and interactions with partners and other colleagues over the course of
many years. Attrition rates are high, and examining these setting-specific nego-
tiated joining practices may better explain who becomes a partner at these
firms and why.
Additionally, my findings suggest that the more dominant negotiated joining
is in these elite groups’ membership processes, the more likely that initial roles
in these groups will be provisional and stable roles will be customized to fit a
combination of group needs and individual inclinations. Negotiated-joining the-
ory predicts a performance benefit for target groups that offer aspirants more
opportunities to mutually construct their roles, because these groups will be
more likely to acquire new members who perform well.
Scope conditions for beneficial role ambiguity. Negotiated joining also
updates previous research that uniformly construes role ambiguity as being
unpleasant for the focal individual, detrimental for group performance, and gen-
erally undesirable (Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman, 1970; Ilgen and Hollenbeck,
1991; Tubre and Collins, 2000; Dierdorff and Rubin, 2007). In the present study,
initial roles were ambiguous because aspirants and target groups mutually and
explicitly agreed on their provisionality. This provisionality allowed roles to be
constructed that were desirable to both the aspirant and the target group and
sometimes allowed aspirants to import novel, disruptive role components into
their target groups. As described earlier, these disruptive role components
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changed group goals and role structures, and respondents reported that these
internal changes allowed groups to adapt to changing demands from the exter-
nal environment. Explicitly ambiguous roles, such as provisional roles, could
generate good role fit through construction as well as promote group adapta-
tion to external uncertainty. The present study suggests a scope condition for
role ambiguity by showing that symmetrically explicit role ambiguity can be
beneficial for both individuals and groups.
A Contingency Theory of New-member Acquisition
Negotiated joining has implications beyond extending our understanding of the
membership dynamics of elite groups and the potential benefits of role ambigu-
ity. The dominance of selection in previous research has led to the generally
unquestioned assumption that systematic new-member acquisition is a norma-
tively and descriptively non-contingent process. The existence of negotiated
joining as a viable alternative to selection calls this assumption into question
and demonstrates the utility of a contingency theory of new-member acquisi-
tion. While previous theory has called for incorporating environmental assess-
ment into the process of strategic job analysis as a precursor to applying
selection methods (Singh, 2008), I argue that the method of new-member
acquisition itself should be contingent on the nature of the environment.
Contingency theories focus on the fit between organizational characteristics
and organizational environments and use degree of fit to explain organizational
performance (Van de Ven, Ganco, and Hinings, 2013). In this case, fit is
between how an organization acquires new members and the degree of prede-
finability of new members’ roles, while performance is the organization’s con-
tinued ability to survive and flourish by adapting to the demands of the
environment.
In stable environments, actions map consistently to outcomes; organizations
can therefore learn from experience and optimize their processes and struc-
tures (Sorenson, 2003) by developing consistent roles and routines (Levitt and
March, 1988). In contrast, action–outcome mappings change unpredictably in
unstable, uncertain environments; roles in organizations operating in such envir-
onments are necessarily emergent and open-ended. Under these latter condi-
tions, a rigid structure of roles and routines is suboptimal (Burns and Stalker,
1961). Instead, organizations and their members must have adaptability—the
dynamic capability to detect external change and change internally in response
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Arrow, McGrath, and Berdahl, 2000; Lewin,
Massini, and Peeters, 2011)—to survive and flourish in uncertain environments
(Argote and McGrath, 1993; Miron-Spektor, Gino, and Argote, 2011).
Negotiated joining both accommodates open-ended roles and can promote
adaptability by stimulating ongoing adjustments to group structure and goals,
which is an unintended side effect of integrating newly validated role compo-
nents. Negotiated joining therefore enables organizing through emergent rela-
tionships within groups (Stewart and Carson, 1997) and serves as a previously
unidentified mechanism for increasing absorptive capacity (Zahra and George,
2002; Lewin, Massini, and Peeters, 2011) by providing ongoing opportunities
for target groups to adapt by absorbing novel skills and information that aspir-
ants bring in from the external environment.
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Whereas previous research has assumed and prescribed that selection is
the sole and normatively preferable method for acquiring new members, this
study introduced external uncertainty and the resulting difficulty in predefining
new members’ roles as a condition that affects an organization’s choice of
new-member-acquisition processes. Negotiated joining and selection are not
mutually exclusive, and my findings show that selection and negotiated joining
can be used in combination: no group I observed relied exclusively on negoti-
ated joining, and every group relied primarily on negotiated joining supplemen-
ted with conventional selection processes such as re´sume´ reviews and
interviews. Consequently, in a contingency theory of new-member acquisition,
the appropriate balance between selection and negotiated joining depends on
the level of uncertainty in the external environment: more uncertain environ-
ments require less-predefined, more open-ended roles and call for more
negotiation-dominant membership management processes.
Limitations and Future Research
This paper set out to document the understudied phenomenon of negotiated
joining in the setting of elite cutting-edge culinary work. To do so, I examined
established groups in this setting and focused on finding similarities across
cases. It is therefore beyond this paper’s scope to explain variations in process
outcomes across groups or individuals. To extend our understanding of how
negotiated joining works, future research should explore the phenomenon in
other settings and pose questions that this study did not address.
Elite cutting-edge culinary groups were an ideal research setting in which
the general process mechanism of negotiated joining was clearly observable.
But because negotiated joining happens in the course of routine work interac-
tions, the specific practices that support negotiated joining are likely to vary
considerably across settings. For example, a venture capital firm seeking a new
general partner is likely to use very different negotiated joining practices than
an academic department seeking a new tenured faculty member. Future
research could document negotiated joining practices in different work and pro-
fessional settings to explore areas of similarity and difference. The contingency
model of new-member acquisition developed above indicates that these efforts
should focus especially on settings marked by high uncertainty.
The type and amount of data I collected—interviews and short-duration
observations—prevented me from examining how and to what extent negoti-
ated joining affected individual and group outcomes beyond what respondents
reported. Respondents said that negotiated joining produced roles that were
mutually desirable, implying greater job satisfaction and longer tenure. They
also said that negotiated joining could stimulate group adaptability, implying
greater group longevity. Future research should explicitly test these proposi-
tions. One possible study could compare groups using negotiation-dominant
member acquisition processes with groups using selection-dominant pro-
cesses to see if there are systematic differences in group longevity and in
members’ tenure and satisfaction. Another study could investigate individual
and group outcomes associated with negotiated joining using longer-term
observations of groups and aspirants. Also, recent research on new ventures in
an uncertain environment shows that new firms with more formal structures
(and thus more clearly predefined roles) outperform those with less formal
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structures (Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch, 2006)—a third study could examine if
and how the effects of negotiated joining vary across organizations at different
stages of development.
Finally, I focused on negotiated joining as a membership process used by
target groups, but my respondents were worthy of study as well: they were
uniformly willing to accept provisional roles and the high likelihood of not con-
structing stable roles for themselves. Respondents indicated that unsuitable
individuals would self-select out, which could suggest systematic differences
between individuals who are effective participants in negotiated joining and
those who are not. Personality is probably part of the explanation: individuals
oriented toward uncertainty and open to new experiences (Hodson and
Sorrentino, 1999) will be more likely to embrace the uncertainty in negotiated
joining, and those who are relatively high in conscientiousness and emotional
stability (Barrick and Mount, 1991; Stewart and Carson, 1997; Le et al., 2011)
will be more likely to handle the interactions involved in negotiated joining
gracefully. The aspirants in this study were drawn from elite pools of individuals
with high ability and flexibility, consistent with previous theorizing that organiz-
ing around emergent relationships would be associated with individuals who
had greater general mental ability (Stewart and Carson, 1997). A research pro-
gram could thus focus on the individual level to identify personality and other
characteristics that make individuals more or less likely to be predisposed to
participate in negotiated joining rather than looking for predefined roles they
can fill.
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